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Under the National Labor Relations Act, the ability of an in-
dividual member of a collective bargaining unit to earn more
than other unit members depends, in the first instance, upon
the consent of his colleagues. Without such consent, negotia-
tions between an individual employee and his employer would
be fruitless. This article will discuss the relationship between
individual employee contracts and collective bargaining agree-
ments. Relevant provisions of current collective bargaining
agreements within these industries will be used to illustrate
the lengths to which labor and management have been willing
to go to preserve the individual employee contract.
II
Foundations of the Relationship Between
Individual and Collective Agreements
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,' the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the relationship between individual contracts and col-
lective agreements. The Court distinguished between
contracts bargained collectively by a representative of the em-
ployees and individual employee contracts.2 Collective bar-
* B.A. Heidelberg College, 1954; J.D. Columbia Law School, 1960. Partner, Baker
& Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
2. The Court's view that the principle of exclusivity under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., [hereinafter NLRA] prevents an employer from
bargaining with any employee representative other than the one chosen by an em-
ployee majority, and does not prevent individual employee contracts, is thus stated:
The provision of § 9(a) that representatives, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining, of the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in that unit, imposes upon the
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gaining requires the employer to meet with the authorized
representative of its employees to negotiate wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, but does not pre-
clude individual contracts. The employer could still contract
directly with individual employees. The Court seemed to sug-
gest "that employers might be able to circumvent the direc-
tives of national labor policy by means of individual contracts
with their employees."3
Despite the suggestive language in Jones & Laughlin, the
Supreme Court in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB 4 and the Sev-
enth Circuit in NLRB v. Jahn & Ollier Eng. Co. I held that con-
tracts following the "Balleisen formula"6 containing provisions
designed to frustrate collective bargaining violated the NLRA.
In National Licorice, the Supreme Court considered individual
employment contracts which were imposed upon the employ-
ees and in which "the signers relinquished the right to strike,
the right to demand a closed shop or signed agreement with
any union."'7 The Court upheld the Board's ban on the em-
ployer's recognition of these individual contracts because the
employees were coerced during an attempt to unionize and be-
cause these contracts "imposed illegal restraints upon the em-
ployees' rights to organize and bargain collectively [as]
guaranteed by sections 7 and 8 of the Act."8
respondent only the duty of conferring and negotiating with the authorized
representatives of its employees for the purpose of settling a labor dis-
pute.... We [haveI said that the obligation to treat with the true representa-
tive was exclusive and hence imposed the negative duty to treat with no other
It was taken "to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts generally
applicable to employees" in the described unit with any other representative
than the one so chosen, "but not as precluding such individual contracts" as
the Company might "elect to make directly with individual employees ...
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It
does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the employer
"from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on
whatever terms" the employer "may by unilateral action determine."
301 U.S. at 44-45.
3. Dekom, Individual vs. Collective Agreements: A Study in Conflict and Union
Leverage, 42 Ford L. Rev. 495, 496 (1974) [hereinafter Dekom].
4. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
5. 123 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1941).
6. That is, a contract between the company and each workman individually and
not as a collective agreement with representatives of the employees.
7. 309 U.S. at 355.
8. 309 U.S. at 360. The heart of the National Labor Relations Act is in the pro-
tected rights set forth in section 7:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
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Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Jahn & Olier Eng.
Co.9 dealt harshly with another attempt to frustrate national
labor relations policy by individual contract. In that case the
company sought to forestall organization of its employees by
offering them a lucrative profit sharing plan in return for indi-
vidual contracts accepting the existing wages and conditions of
employment for two years. In the event of a strike, the employ-
ees would be required to forfeit rights under the contracts and
would be subject to immediate discharge. Both the Board and
the Seventh Circuit found that these provisions interfered with
the right to bargain and organize and directed the employer to
cease and -desist from continuing to enforce such contracts.
The Supreme Court, in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 10 took the next
and most significant step, ruling that the company's refusal to
bargain was unlawful even though the company defended its
refusal by asserting that previously executed individual em-
ployment contracts precluded the necessity of a collective
agreement for bargaining unit members.1
The J.I. Case Company executed individual contracts of em-
ployment with about seventy-five percent of its employees.
These contracts were effective for a one-year period and basi-
cally established the terms and conditions of employment.
While these contracts were in effect, a labor organization peti-
tioned the NLRB for certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the production and maintenance employees
of the company. Despite the company's insistence that the in-
dividual contracts constituted a bar to representation proceed-
ings, the Board directed an election which the union won. The
company then refused to bargain collectively with the newly
certified union over any rights or obligations that had already
been established' by the existing individual employment con-
tracts. The National Labor Relations Board found that the
company's conduct was an unlawful refusal to bargain and the
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organ-
ization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3). In addi-
tion, section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer t'o
interfere with the rights guaranteed in Section 7.
9. 123 F.2d at 593 (7th Cir. 1941).
10. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
11. Id. at 333, 339.
No. 41
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Supreme Court affirmed. Although there was no evidence of
coercion or of any unfair labor practices, the Court concluded
that these voluntarily executed individual contracts could not
be utilized by the employer to limit its collective bargaining ob-
ligations under the Act.12
J.I. Case & Co. v. NLRB is the Supreme Court's only compre-
hensive effort to integrate individual contracts into the concept
of collective bargaining. It is an important case because it con-
tains some guidelines for individual contracts in the collective
bargaining relationship. For instance, the Court notes that al-
though collective bargaining agreements generally set forth
the terms governing hiring, work, and pay, they are not em-
ployment contracts in the usual sense.' 3 Moreover, "[i]n the
sense of contracts of hiring, individual contracts between the
employer and employee are not forbidden, but indeed are ne-
cessitated by the collective bargaining procedure."' 4
III
Subservient Relationship of Individual
Employment Contracts to Collective
Bargaining Agreements
J.L Case made it clear that the individual employment con-
tract may not be used to defeat or postpone the collective bar-
gaining process provided for in the NLRA.' 5 Thus, the Court
eliminated the possibility of individual contracts forestalling
bargaining or subtracting from the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. When such contracts are inconsistent, the
collective bargaining agreement supersedes the individual
agreement so that benefits derived from the collective bargain-
ing agreement are not impliedly waived.
The Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of lim-
iting the right to strike by individual contract. However, the
NLRB and the lower federal courts have ruled that individual
contracts may not be used to thwart rights protected by the
National Labor Relations Act. These protected rights 6 include
the rights of employees to organize and to bargain collectively,
12. Id.
13. Id. at 336-37.
14. Id. at 335-36.
15. Id. at 337.
16. Protected rights are those encompassed by section 7 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act. See note 8, supra, for the text of section 7.
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and the right to engage in economic action to support bargain-
ing demands. 7
In so ruling the NLRB and the lower federal courts stead-
fastly adhered to the principles of J.I. Case, deciding 8 in each
instance that an individual agreement, inconsistent with a col-
lective agreement, is superseded by the terms of the collective
agreement.' 9
The decision in Morio v. North American Soccer League20 un-
derscores the futility of any attempt to enter into individual
contracts without the union's blessing. In Morio, the North
American Soccer League Players Association (NASLPA) was
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the em-
ployee-players of the North American Soccer League clubs
(NASL). NASL refused to 'bargain with NASLPA and con-
tested the NLRB's determination of a single "[1]eague-wide
unit." Following NLRB proceedings on the issue, NASL was
directed by the NLRB,2 2 and later the Fifth Circuit,2 3 to recog-
nize and bargain with NASLPA as the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative of the soccer players.
NASL admitted that while processing its case through the
NLRB and the courts, it made unilateral changes in the em-
17. See NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1942); Arcade-Sunshine Co., Inc., 12
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 259 (1939), enforced, 118 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 567 (1941); Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., 18 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 43 (1939), modified, 21
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 655 (1940).
18. "It is clear that since Case was decided, individual contracts have not fared
well when in conflict with a collective bargaining agreement .... [A] simple look at
the majority of cases illustrates the futility of encouraging a client to fight for his rights
as an individual under a separate contract when it will mean a conflict with the union's
negotiated agreement." Dekom, supra note 3, at 506.
19. See Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210
F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), a.ffd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189
F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Port Gibson Veneer & Box Co., 167 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 819 (1948); Lewellyn v. Fleming, 154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 715 (1946); Morio v. North American Soccer League, 501 F.
Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affid, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Morio v. North American Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. at 639-640.
21. Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act gives the Board the authority
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. This determination will be overturned
by the courts only if it is arbitrary and capricious. Because the union's power base can
be undermined or enhanced by the Board's decision, this determination is often hotly
contested. In North American Soccer League the team owners wanted individual team
bargaining units. The players wanted to bolster their strength by securing a league-
wide bargaining unit which would require the owners to bargain jointly in a multi-
employer bargaining unit.
22. 241 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1225 (1979).
23. 613 F.2d at 1380.
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ployment conditions of employees in the unit, and that it nego-
tiated and entered into individual contracts with employees of
the unit which modified previously existing individual con-
tracts.24 The NLRB's Regional Director filed a petition seeking
a temporary injunction enjoining NASL from continuing such
conduct and from giving effect to the individual contracts or
any modification, continuation, extension or renewal thereof.
The district court granted the temporary injunction and em-
phasized "[t] he Act requires [the employer] to bargain collec-
tively with the Union. The obligation is exclusive. This duty to
bargain with the exclusive representative carries with it the
negative duty not to bargain with individual employees. 25
A. Role of the Individual Employment Contract in the Collective
Bargaining Process
Although J.I. Case limited the right to enter into individual
employment contracts, it carefully "reserve[d] a field for the
individual contract, even in industries covered by the National
Labor Relations Act .... 126 Thus, there is a proper place for
individual contracts in the collective bargaining process.2 7 An
employer and employee may negotiate for an individual con-
tract under the proper circumstances so long as it is done in a
lawful manner.28 "Collective bargains need not and do not al-
24. 501 F. Supp. at 637.
25. Id. at 639.
26. 321 U.S. at 336.
27. The J.. Case Court noted that, although proper in some instances, individual
contracts are not generally looked upon with favor by organized labor.
The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on
such individual advantages. Of course, where there is great variation in cir-
cumstances of employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for the col-
lective bargain to prescribe only minimum rates or maximum hours or
expressly to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining.
Id. at 338.
28. The Court suggested the following circumstances in which an individual con-
tract would be appropriate:
Men may continue work[ing] after a collective [bargaining] agreement ex-
pires, and despite [negotiations] in good faith, the negotiation may be dead-
locked or delayed; in the interim expressed or implied individual agreements
may be held to govern. The conditions for collective bargaining may not exist;
thus a majority of the employees may refuse to join a union or to agree upon or
designate bargaining representatives, or the majority may not be demonstra-
ble by the means prescribed by the statute, or a previously existent majority
may have been lost without unlawful interference by the employer and no




ways settle or embrace every exception. It may be agreed that
particular situations are reserved for individual contracting
either completely or within prescribed limits."29
Specific rules have emerged from cases dealing with individ-
ual contracts entered into with employees who are covered by
a collective agreement. First, an employer generally cannot
negotiate wages or other terms of employment directly with an
employee once a duly authorized bargaining representative
has been selected. "Such unilateral activities are antithetical
to the basic philosophy of the Act which is the encouragement
of collective-as opposed to individual-bargaining."30 In the
areas which collective agreement leaves open to individual
bargaining, the union must expressly waive its traditional ex-
clusive bargaining rights and authorize direct negotiations be-
tween the individual employees and the employer. The
union's waiver must be "clear and unmistakable": because it
results in a loss of traditional bargaining rights, a waiver is nar-
rowly construed.3 1
A waiver of exclusive bargaining rights may be viewed as an
arrangement analogous to a union shop32 or dues checkoff pro-
vision 33 since it derives its legal protection34 from the express
written agreement of the parties. The waiver and the collective
bargaining agreement expire simultaneously since the em-
ployer may not lawfully negotiate with the employee directly
or through an agent without the specific provision.
Second, national labor policy is rooted in the principle of ma-
jority rule.36 Read against that backdrop, the language of J..
Case strongly suggests that a waiver of exclusive bargaining
29. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 347 (1944).
30. NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (lst Cir. 1963).
31. See C & C Plywood Corp., 148 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 414 (1964), enforcement de-
nied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 421 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 939
(1967); Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1096 (1949).
32. A union shop is created when the employer and union agree all employees will
be required to join the union as a condition of employment. Limitation on the lawful-
ness of such agreements are found in §§ 88(3) and 14(b) of the NLRA.
33. A dues check-off provision in the collective bargaining agreement facilitates
the union's dues collection by requiring the employer to withhold the dues from mem-
ber's paychecks.
34. Without the union's express written consent the employer would be vulnera-
ble to an attack under § 88(5) of the NL.A for refusing to bargain with his employees'
representative.
35. See Morio v. North American Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
af'd, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. See NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
No. 41
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rights is "the only way an individual can obtain better terms
than his co-workers without forcing his employer to commit an
unfair labor practice."3
Third, in judging whether a contract provides for better
terms than a certain minimum or whether terms and condi-
tions are less favorable than those set forth in the basic agree-
ment, the totality of the package must be considered. In
Midland Broadcasting Co.,38 the Board dealt with Midland's
alleged violation of its duty to bargain collectively as well as
interference with the exercise of protected rights. These viola-
tions consisted of executing and continuing individual con-
tracts with its staff actors and singers despite the fact that the
union was the exclusive agent of the artists. In finding no un-
fair labor practices, the Board was particularly persuaded by
two considerations:
1. The pertinent contract between the union and the company
expressly authorized direct negotiations between the com-
pany and its artists. 39
2. All parties agreed that under the special circumstances
present in the entertainment industry, the individual bar-
gaining provisions in question were consistent with Mid-
land's bargaining obligations under the NLRA.4°
In general, the union and General Counsel contended that
the individual contracts .did not contain terms better than
those in the collective bargaining agreement. The individual
employment contracts in question
differed from the union contracts in that they afforded the art-
ist an opportunity to earn a bonus over and above the mini-
mum rates of pay guaranteed by the union contracts, but at the
same time imposed certain restrictions on the artist, designed
in general to assure that the Respondent would receive the ex-
clusive benefit of its investment in the artist.4
1
The Board found nothing offensive to national labor policy in
these individual contracts. It viewed the responsibilities and
restrictions placed on the artists as the quid pro quo for the
bonus arrangement and refused to remake the individual con-
37. Dekom, supra note 3, at 498. See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962),
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
38. 93 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 455 (1951).
39. Id. at 455.
40. Id. at 455-56.
41. Id. at 456.
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tracts by eliminating the burdensome provisions.42
J.I. Case and its progeny lead to the conclusion that individ-
ual contracts are permitted to coexist with collective bargain-
ing agreements as long as they are authorized by the basic
collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, individual con-
tracts may not limit bargaining rights, subtract from the collec-
tive agreement or frustrate the collective bargaining process.
IV
Media-Related Individual Contract Cases
Decisions and cases considering the relationship between
media-related individual employment contracts and collective
agreements are relatively rare. In spite of their limited
number, those opinions which exist provide some interesting
insights into the relationship, between these contracts and the
role of media-related individual employment agreements in
the industry.43 State court decisions highlight the role which
state courts should play in the development of labor law under
the National Labor Relations Act.
NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co. 4 is a media-related exam-
ple of the proposition that individual contracts, although not
unlawful in themselves, cannot be used to thwart rights pro-
tected by the NLRA. The Specific right impacted in Valley
Broadcasting was the right to organize and to be represented
by a union.
In response to American Federation of Radio Artists' organi-
zational efforts, Valley Broadcast Company, the owner and op-
erator of Radio Station WSTV in Steubenville, Ohio, submitted
individual contracts of employment to each of its announcers.
The proposed contracts set forth some of the existing condi-
tions under which the announcers had been working and, in
addition, accorded additional benefits to the announcers. Al-
though these contracts were not signed, they were accepted
and thereafter, the announcers abandoned their union plans.
42. Id.
43. In addition to Midland Broadcasting Co., NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189
F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951); Sloan v. Journal Publishing Co., 213 Or. 324, 324 P.2d 449 (1958);
American Broadcasting Co. v. Brandt, 56 Misc. 2d 198, 287 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. 1968),
afd, 30 A.D.2d 935, 293 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1968); and Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Baldwin, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13, 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), are media cases
that discuss and consider the issue.
44. 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951).
No. 4]
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The court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Board
findings of Section 8 (a) (1) 11 and 8 (a) (5) 46 violations. The court
focused on the fact that Valley Broadcasting Company knew
"that the union had been designated as a bargaining represen-
tative for the announcers [but nevertheless] undertook to bar-
gain with them as individuals."47 The court held that such
subversive conduct violated the employers' duty to bargain
with its employees' designated bargaining agent.48
Sloan v. Journal Publishing Co. 49 sets forth another role
which individual contracts may play in the collective bargain-
ing relationship. The principles of exclusivity, majoritarian-
ism, and the subordination of individual agreements to
collective bargain contracts deal with "employees" as defined
in the NLRA. ° Where individuals are not "employees" or
where "employees" are outside of the bargaining unit to which
a collective agreement applies, they may speak and contract
for themselves.
In Journal Publishing Co., plaintiffs, former employees of the
45. NLRA 88(a) (1) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7."
46. NLRA 8(a) (5) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)."
47. 189 F.2d at 585.
48. The court quoted from Medo Photo Supply v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944) as
follows:
The statute guarantees to all employees the right to bargain collectively
through their chosen representatives. Bargaining carried on by the employer
directly with the employees, whether a minority or majority, who have not
revoked their designation of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the
mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained, as the Board,
the expert body in this field, has found.
189 F.2d at 587.
49. 213 Or. 324, 324 P.2d 449 (1958).
50. NLRA § 2(3) states:
The term employee shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individ-
ual having the status of any independent contractor, or any individual em-
ployed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to
the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person
who is not an employer as herein defined.
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Journal Publishing Company', upon their own initiative, re-
quested that they terminate their status as "employees" and
contract with the company as independent contractors. At the
time of this request these employees were covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the company and Portland
Guild. The company accepted the former employees' proposal
to become wholesale dealers. Thereafter, the parties executed
independent contracts of employment ("Wholesale Dealer
Agreements,") and the former employees became independent
contractors. The union threatened to strike unless the com-
pany refused to honor the individual contracts with former em-
ployees, whereupon the former employees brought suit to
enjoin the company from terminating or breaching the individ-
ual "Wholesale Dealer Agreements."
The Oregon Supreme Court, in upholding the claims of the
former employees, distinguished this case from J.. Case Co.
which concerned employer use of individual contracts of em-
ployment with regular employees to limit its bargaining obliga-
tions under the Act.51 The court found that unlike J.. Case,
Journal Publishing Co. involved employees resigning to be-
come independent contractors.2 Thus, the contracts made
with the former employees were not inconsistent with the col-
lective bargaining agreement nor in violation of the NLRA be-
cause the collective agreement applied only to employees and
because the former employee-plaintiffs were considered to be
independent contractors.53
The state courts of New York considered union directives
that members honor a picket line of another union in American
Broadcasting Co. v. Brandt54 and Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem v. Baldwin." In both cases, although the underlying col-
lective bargaining agreement had expired, individual contracts
of employment with famous personalities were in force. The
union, American Federation of Radio and Television Artists
(AFTRA), was sued by the respective companies on the theory
that such a directive constituted tortious interference with con-
tractual rights.
51. 213 Or. at 356, 324 P.2d at 464.
52. 213 Or. at 357-58, 324 P.2d at 465.
53. Id.
54. 56 Misc. 2d 198, 287 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd, 30 A.D.2d 935, 293
N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dept. 1968).
55. 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 113,275 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1972).
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Both courts based subject matter jurisdiction on the compel-
ling state interest exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion.56 Because the union's orders were not related to any
labor dispute between it and CBS, the court held 'that the
union's action constituted interference with contractual rela-
tions without any corresponding substantial benefit to the
union. The court thus issued preliminary injunctions against
the union pending a precise determination of the facts.
In summary, Brandt and Baldwin stand as anomalies in the
group of decisions considering conflicting provisions in individ-
ual and collective agreements. The anomalous nature of these
decisions is summarized by one author as follows:
If the individual contracts are indeed a part of the collective
bargaining agreement (which may not yet be fully negotiated)
then it is difficult to conceptualize how a union may be found
liable for the tortious interference with its own contract. On
the other hand, if the individual contracts are seen as separate
and distinct from the collective agreement, then the doctrine of
Case and related decisions would seem to compel that the indi-
vidual agreements yield to the collective one.57
There is no doubt that J.. Case Co. and its progeny apply with
equal force to the media. The Brandt and Baldwin cases do
not provide a sound legal basis for a contrary position.
IV
Media Reaction to JL Case Co. and
Related Cases
As Midland Broadcasting, Brandt and Baldwin illustrate,
the communications and entertainment industries quickly
adapted to the decision of the Supreme Court in J.. Case. It
56. Where the conduct complained of is actually or arguably an unfair labor prac-
tice, as a general rule, the NLRB has primary jurisdiction over the dispute and state
law is preempted by the federal legislation. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Two exceptions exist to this general rule: "[W]here the
activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act ... [o]r where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direc-
tion, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." Id.
at 243-44. In Brandt threatened violence and tortious interference with contract claims
were asserted to bring the conduct within the compelling state interest exception. In
Baldwin, although there was no threatened violence, it does not appear that any seri-
ous jurisdictional challenges were made.
57. Dekom, supra note 3, at 520.
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became apparent that although many "above the line" 8 em-
ployees in the radio and television industries were either will-
ing to join unions or were required to become union members
as a result of a union security clause, 9 these employees
showed a marked reluctance to accept the underlying principle
of collectivism. Instead, they jealously guarded the concept of
individually-negotiated salaries as well as other terms and con-
ditions of employment. Generally, employers do not strenu-
ously object to such an attitude.
Most radio and television labor contracts for above-the-line
employees contain clear waivers of exclusivity of representa-
tion in the area of wages and permit the individual employee to
bargain for a better deal on matters covered by the contract as
well as those that are not. For example, a recent AFTRA con-
tract with a broadcasting company contains the following
provisions:
I. RECOGNITION:
1. The Company recognizes AFTRA as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for all persons, hereinafter referred to as 'artists,'
employed at Television Station __ in the Staff and Staff clas-
sification, as hereinafter provided in Section 1 of Schedule I,
and who are scheduled by the Company to perform profession-
ally for broadcast purposes before the microphone and for
camera.
IV. NETWORK PERFORMANCES:
1. The Company agrees that the minimum terms and condi-
tions covering the employment of artists for network (two or
more stations) television appearances originating at or through
the facilities of the Company are those contained in the cur-
rently applicable AFTRA NATIONAL CODE OF FAIR PRAC-
TICE FOR NETWORK TELEVISION BROADCASTING, and
renewals thereof, which Code is incorporated in this Agree-
ment to the extent applicable to and for the sole purpose of the
provisions of Section 1 of this Article IV.
V. DEDUCTIONS: No deductions, directly or indirectly, by
way of commission or otherwise, may be made from the salary
of any artist by which any artist shall receive less than the
weekly minimum salary established for the artist in this Agree-
ment, such minimums being net to the artist except for deduc-
58. "Above the line" employees include talent, announcers, sportscasters, etc.
59. Union security clauses come in a variety of shapes and forms. In general, any
clause which serves to secure the union's position as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees is a union security clause. Examples of such clauses are
union shop and dues check-off provisions.
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tions required by law or authorized by the artist and approved
by the Company.
VI. CONTRACTS WITH ARTISTS: The Company agrees that
it will not enter into any contract with or employ any artist
upon terms and conditions less favorable to the artist than
those applicable terms and conditions set forth herein. The
Company agrees that no waiver or release by any artist of the
provisions of this Agreement shall be sought by the Company
or be effective unless the written consent of AFTRA to such
waiver or release is first had and obtained.
The Company further agrees that nothing in this Agreement
shall be deemed to prevent any artist from negotiating for or
obtaining better terms than the minimum terms provided
herein. The Company further agrees, for the benefit of AFTRA
and all artists, that the existing rates and conditions of employ-
ment of artists are hereby modified in accordance herewith,
but no terms or hours now had by any artist which are more
favorable to such artist than the terms, wages, or hours herein
specified shall be deemed so modified.
There are a number of other interesting provisions in the
agreement, including a sweeping management rights clause,6 0
a definition of persons covered by the contract, a clause dealing
with strikes, and an arbitration provision.6 1
Similarly, a National Association of Broadcast Employees
and Technicians (NABET) contract covering news reporters
provides, in part:
19.1 Over-scale Contracts
(a) Any news reporter who is engaged to perform services
at a scale, or under terms or conditions over and above mini-
mum scales, terms and conditions provided for in this Agree-
ment, shall nevertheless have the protection and benefit of all
other provisions and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
(b) Additional Services
No services of a news reporter are contracted for except as
specified herein. This paragraph is not intended to prevent the
news reporter from contracting for services of a kind not cov-
ered by the Agreement by individual contract at such rates of
60. A management rights clause gives the employer the right to take unilateral
action with respect to the areas encompassed by such clause. It is, in effect, a waiver of
the union's right to bargain specifically about the action during the term of the
contract.
61. It specifically provides arbitration as the sole and exclusive remedy for any
"act, omission, neglect, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance which has taken
place during the term of this Agreement, whether such remedy is availed of, before or
after the termination of this Agreement,..."
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pay and under such conditions as the Company and the news
reporter shall agree, subject only to the fact that it shall not be
in conflict with this Agreement.
(c) Personal Services Contracts for bargaining unit em-
ployees will be sent to the International Office of the Union
within ten (10) working days of execution. Provisions of Per-
sonal Service Contracts alleged to be in violation of this Agree-
ment shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration
provisions outlined in 17.(1) (d).
19.2 Minimum Terms and Conditions
It is agreed that every written contract and/or fee schedule
(now or hereafter) made between the Company and every
news reporter represented by NABET shall be submitted to
NABET and contain the following clause:
"In the event a news reporter's individual contract is of
longer duration than this Agreement, then, for such period of
duration and until a new Agreement is agreed to, we covenant
not to bring or maintain any action or proceedings against you,
because you refrain from rendering your services under this
contract by reason of any strike or work stoppage (whether
partial or complete) called or ordered by NABET. In such
event we covenant (a) that neither NABET nor any of its rep-
resentatives shall be deemed to have induced you to breach
this contract, and, (b) that for the direct benefit of NABET and
its representatives, we will not bring or maintain any action or
proceedings against them, based upon or arising either out of
the existence of this contract or out of your failure to render
services under this contract. Upon the resumption of work af-
ter such strike or stoppage, all the terms and conditions of this
contract shall be reinstated for the balance of the term hereof;
provided, however, that if a collective bargaining agreement
covering work of the type provided for herein is signed by us,
you will, from and after the effective date provided for in such
agreement, receive the benefit of any applicable provisions of
such agreement which may be more favorable to you than the
terms of this contract. We further agree that your obligations
hereunder shall be subject and subordinate to your primary
obligations to NABET to obey its Constitution and By-Laws."
The provisions of the above paragraph shall survive the expi-
ration or cancellation of this Agreement as to all such contracts
with news reporters in existence while this Agreement is in
effect.
Guild contracts in the newspaper industry routinely permit
the negotiation of wages above the minimum set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement. As noted earlier, similar lan-
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guage, some more sophisticated, some more ambiguous, ap-
pears in labor contracts in the entertainment, newspaper and
broadcast industries. Experienced negotiators in those indus-
tries are well aware of what should, at a minimum, be included
in a labor agreement if individual contracts with employees are
to be permitted.
Currently, the most troublesome problems involve the status
and rights of individuals under a contract which continues af-
ter the collective bargaining agreement expires, and union
rights to company information for policing the collective bar-
gaining agreement and preparing for collective bargaining.2
A. Individual Negotiations after Expiration of Collective Bargaining
Agreement Containing Express Language Waiving
Exclusivity of Representation
As noted earlier,63 absent a clear and unmistakable waiver,
an employer generally cannot negotiate wages or other terms
of employment directly with an employee once a duly author-
ized bargaining representative has been selected. As a general
principle, mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment which
have been embodied in a collective bargaining agreement, sur-
vive its termination. These subjects are not supported solely
by the collective bargaining agreement. That is, the employer's
obligation to maintain these basic considerations withstands
termination of the collective bargaining agreement. Absent
good faith collective bargaining and a bargaining impasse,
these items may not be unilaterally altered by an employer
upon contract expiration.64 Otherwise, the employer circum-
vents the duty to negotiate and in effect would constitute a flat
refusal to negotiate.65
When bargaining has reached an impasse, however, an em-
ployer may unilaterally implement proposals discussed with
the union at the bargaining table. General rules governing
such unilateral implementation were set forth by the Supreme
62. Other problem areas not discussed in this article are the disciplining of em-
ployees, double-breasted operations, the proper time for negotiating with individuals
and the determination of when unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment are made.
63. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text, supra.
64. See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 475 (1967).
65. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
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Court in NLRB v. Katz.66 There, the Court stated that an em-
ployer may unilaterally change wages, hours, and working con-
ditions after bargaining to an impasse with the employee
representative if those items are offered during bargaining. It
is highly unlikely, however, that items unique to the individual
contracts would have been the subject of proposals and discus-
sion at the bargaining table.
On the other hand, there are certain unique items which are
mandatory subjects of bargaining and which, because of their
nature, expire with the contract. Examples of such items are
provisions for union shop67 and check-off of union dues.68
These arrangements derive their legal protection from their
presence in a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, when the
agreement terminates so does the legal protection and obliga-
tion to maintain the arrangement. 9 Union waivers which au-
thorize direct negotiations between individual employees and
their employer are analogous to these provisions. Under such
agreements, the union waives its right to insist on being the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent for employees for all
wages, terms and conditions of employment. Thus, an area is
carved out for individual negotiations. Absent such a specific
provision, it would be unlawful for an employer to negotiate
with an employee on an individual basis. In Morio v. North
American Soccer League, 0 the court enjoined the employers
from enforcing individual contracts entered into after the date
of certification of the NASLPA as well as those which were in
existence and continued to be effective after that date. Thus,
employers can neither enter into negotiations with individuals
nor continue to enforce individual contracts after a collective
bargaining agreement containing an express waiver of exclu-
sive representation has expired-unless the union authorizes
such negotiations.
66. 369 U.S. 736 (1962); see also, NLRB v. Compton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217
(1949).
67. See note 32, supra; see also Heart of America Meat Distributors Association,
168 NLRB (CCH) 0Dec. No. 110 (1968).
68. See note 33, supra; see also Industrial Marine and Shipbuilding Workers v.
NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963).
69. See note 34 and accompanying text, supra.
70. 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
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B. Union Rights to Company Information
In S.L. Allen & Co. ,71 the Board said that "[c] ommunication
of facts peculiarly within the knowledge of either party is...
of the essence of the bargaining process." In the ensuing 45
years since that decision companies and unions have been
striving to determine precisely what information must be di-
vulged by one to the other. Some general guidelines have
developed.
An employer is required to provide a union with information
only if it is relevant to, and therefore reasonably necessary for,
the union's proper performance of its duties as the employees'
collective bargaining representative." In determining whether
requested information is relevant, the Board and the courts
have adopted four standards depending upon whether the in-
formation relates to wage matters involving employees within
the bargaining unit, other matters pertinent to terms and con-
ditions of employment of employees within the bargaining
unit, or matters associated with the financial and business as-
pects of the employer's operations.73
First, any information which a union requests regarding
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of in-unit employ-
ees is presumptively relevant, provided the union has not
waived its right to receive such information.74 Second, a union
must affirmatively demonstrate the relevancy of requests for
non-wage information pertaining to terms and conditions of
employment of in-unit employees before the employer is obli-
gated to respond to the request.7" Third, information related to
the financial and business aspects of an employer's operation
71. 1 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 714, 728 (1936), enforced, 2 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 780 (3d Cir.
1938).
72. See, e.g., Curtis-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1965), enforced,
145 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 152 (1963); F.W. Woolworth Co., 109 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 196, 197
(1954), enforcement denied, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, 235 U.S. 939
(1956).
73. See Curtis Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965); Bartosic & Hartley,
The Employer's Duty To Supply Information to the Union, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 23
(1972).
74. See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 2097 (1954), en-
forced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955); BFR Broadcasting Corp., 181 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 560,
562 (1970); Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Washington Post Company, 237 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1493
(1978).
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Curtis-Wright Corp.
v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
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need not be furnished to a union unless the employer takes a
position in collective bargaining which, in order to be substan-
tiated, requires the furnishing of such information.76 Fourth, if
a union clearly and unmistakably waives its right to bargain
over an item during the term of an agreement, the union may
lose its right to demand information on that topic during the
term of the agreement.77
When a proper request for information regarding individual
contracts is made, the request must be assessed carefully us-
ing the above analytical framework. The NLRB has been lib-
eral in its assessment of what is relevant and/or reasonably
needed by a union in the proper performance of its duties as
the employees' collective bargaining representative.7 8
VI
Conclusion
Where an employee is in a collective bargaining unit, the em-
ployer's first duty is to bargain with the representative desig-
nated by a majority of the members of that unit. Individual
contracts are valid only to the extent they are expressly au-
thorized by a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, indi-
vidual contracts may not be used by employers as a tool to
reduce the benefits conferred on employees by the collective
bargaining agreement. Where bargaining units are composed
of individuals who desire their unior to establish minimum
wages, hours and working conditions on their behalf without
fixing the upper limits, such can be accomplished provided
that the negotiators are careful that the collective bargaining
agreement incorporates the requisite latitude. Such collective
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Pine Industrial
Relations Committee Inc., 118 NLRB Dec. (CCH), 1055 (1957), enforced, 263 F.2d 83
(D.C. Cir. 1959), N.L.R.B. General Counsel Administrative Ruling No. SR-2064, 50
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1530 (1962).
77. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 170 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1672 (1968); Hughes Tool
Co., 100 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 208 (1952). For cases dealing with the unlawful refusal of a
communications company to furnish the names of individuals with whom it had indi-
vidual contracts and the money being paid those individuals under the individual con-
tracts, see Scott Broadcasting Co., Case No. 22-CA-1946, September 29, 1964; KCMO
Broadcasting and AFTRA, 145 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 550 (1963). With regard to the ques-
tion of confidentiality, sensitivity or privileged nature of information sought, see Mem-
orandum of NLRB General Counsel Irving To Field Offices, Memo 79-22 (April 9, 1979);
Daily Labor Report (BNA) D-1, April 13, 1979.
78. See NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 239 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 106 (1978).
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bargaining agreements supplemented by individual contracts
are particularly appr6priate in media-related industries where
each employee wants to be assured of minimum compensation
while retaining the ability to enter into a more favorable ar-
rangement on the basis of his own personal talent.
